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TRANSNATIONAL CYBER CRIME,
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL LAWS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION:
BY REPRESSION?
by
NADINA FOGGETTI*
Computer crime or cyber-crime, i.e. unlawful conduct committed over the Internet,  
is spilling over national borders and causing a huge legal headache, particularly in  
the matter of deciding which jurisdiction such crime should fall under. The law is  
not always prepared for meeting the demands of globalisation and new unlawful  
activities based on the illicit use of ICTs. The intrinsic cross-border character of this  
new type of crime also creates a need for improved cross-border law enforcement co-
operation at European and international level.
As  EU  integration  continues,  the  need  for  better  coordination  of  criminal  
policies is accentuated. This is true in particular for the field of fight against cyber  
crime. There are different multinational projects to interconnect these policies. Des-
pite the existence of organs and structure such as the Europol High Tech crime  
group, it cannot be claimed that an elaborated coherent horizontal policy in Europe  
on the fight against cyber crime exists. A continuing situation of uncoordinated  
policy in Europe would increase the problem by leading to fragmented anti cyber  
crime actions, a state of affairs which could potentially be exploited by criminals.
In this article we analyse, from the perspective of Italian and foreing criminal  
law a cross border cyber crime. The problem of cross border cyber crime reinforces  
the need to globalise the law and the way we respond to a problem that transcends  
national borders.
* PhD – University of Bari, Department of International law and UE law, 
nadinafoggetti@gmail. com.
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EUROPEAN LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CYBER CRIME [1]
The rapid development of Internet and other information system has given 
rise to a completely new economic sector and to new rapid flows of inform-
ation, products and services across the internal and external borders of the 
EU. The new sector also contributes considerably to the economic growth in 
many areas in Europe. However, the same development has also opened 
many new possibilities for criminals. A pattern of new criminal activities 
against the Internet, or with the use of information systems as a criminal 
tool, is clearly discernible. These criminal activities are in permanent evolu-
tion and legislation and operational  law enforcement have obvious diffi-
culties in keeping pace. The intrinsic cross-border character of this new type 
of crime also creates a need for improved cross-border law enforcement co-
operation.
All Member States have national policies against cyber crime or certain 
aspects of cyber crime. There are also different multinational projects to in-
terconnect these policies. These projects often concern particular aspects of 
the problem area, such as the fight against child pornography or the fight 
against illegal trade.
There are  also  more relevant  legal  acts  and instrument regarding the 
policy against cyber crimes at international and EU level.
The Council of Europe Convention1 on cyber crime is no doubt the most 
important and comprehensive international instrument in this field, but its 
significance depends also on its application. About this specific problem, we 
can  see  that  same  States  have  not  ratified  the  CoE  Convention  on  19 
November  2007.  The CoE Convention aims  to  facilitate  international  co-
operation, detection, investigation and prosecution of cyber crime and calls 
for establishing a common basis for substantive and procedural law and for 
jurisdiction.
1 CoE Convention on cyber crime, December 21, 2001. http://www.coe.int/
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With respect to the CoE Convention, the Framework Decision (FD) on 
Attacks against Information Systems 2005/222/JHA2 places emphasis rather 
on approximation of criminal law improving cooperation between judicial 
and other authorities, calling for the use of existing networks of operational 
points.
The FD on combat  Child Pornography on Internet  2004/68/JHA3 calls 
Member States to promote and facilitate investigation and prosecutions, to 
cooperate with Europol and Interpol and also to build up dialogues with 
the industry.
The Directive on Electronic Commerce 2000/31/EC4 is important in rela-
tion to issues of responsibility as it excludes same obligations of network 
operators to monitor the information they transmit or store.
The Directive  on Privacy and Electronic  Communication 2002/58/EC,5 
besides containing provision on spam, envisages also an obligation for ser-
vice providers to take measures to safeguard security and to inform users in 
case of particular risk or breach of security of the network. The Directive on 
the Retention of Data 2006/24/EC6 is particularly relevant for the purpose of 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences as 
it ensures at EU level that certain data, in the course of the supply of com-
munications services, are retained for a certain period of time.
As EU integration continues, the need for better coordination of criminal 
policy is accentuated. This is true in particular of the field of fight against 
cyber crime. A continuing situation of uncoordinated policies in Europe and 
the International law, would increase the problem by leading to fragmented 
anti  cyber crime actions, a state of affairs which could potentially be ex-
ploited by criminals.
2 Framework decision, 2005-02-24, on Attacks against Information System, 2005/222/JHA, 
Official Journal L 69, 2005-03-16, p. 67.
3 Framework decision, 2004-01-20, on combat Child Pornography on Intenet, Official Journal L 
13/44, 2004-01-20, p. 45.
4 Directive, 2000-06-08, on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), in Official  
Journal, L 178, 2000-07-17, p. 34.
5 Directive, 2002-07-02, on Privacy and Electronic Communication, in Official Journal L 201, 
2002-07-31, p. 45.
6 Directive, 2006-03-15, on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with 
the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public 
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006/24/EC, in Official  
Journal, L 105 , 2006-04-13
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The risk that criminal would exploit differences between Member States 
is even more concrete when it comes to differences in legislation. Criminals 
may choose to set up shop in a country in which a specific activity is pun-
ished more mildly or is not even criminalized.
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CYBER CRIME [2]
As a consequence of the technical evolution, criminals are now using fast 
networks allowing them to commit crimes over different national judicial 
territories in a very short period of time and also to eliminate evidence, just 
as quickly. Due to the across border nature of cyber crime, criminals can 
also easily obtain significant comparative advantages in relation to law en-
forcement authorities. Law enforcers also have the problem of getting used 
to continuous new forms of crime, of handling the increasing number of 
cases  and of  reacting  quickly  within  the  national  jurisdiction  as  well  as 
across other jurisdiction. In the field of the fight against cyber crime, there 
are relevant problems in order to determine the jurisdiction and the law en-
forceable.
A specific issue, in this field is the freedom of the States in international 
law to determine their jurisdiction to prescribe.7
Every State establishes the operativeness of its own jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and it can expand the national jurisdiction by establishing other cri-
teria, such as the principle of defence, the principle of criminal citizenship.8 
The changes of policy of legislative objectives, change highly influence the 
operation of national jurisdiction. The difference between the criteria of jur-
isdiction of the States determines positive and negative conflicts of jurisdic-
tion.
It is therefore necessary to create uniform rules at the international level 
to  encourage  coordination  between  national  courts  and  cooperation 
between States in the fight against transnational crime.
In the field of transnational cyber crimes, there are the CoE Convention 
and the FD. These instruments contain specific rules concerning the prob-
7 Picotti, R.I. 1996, La legge penale, in Bricola-Zagrebelsky (a cura di), Giurisprudenza sistematica  
del diritto penale, Parte generale, I, Torino.
8 Cfr. Woolsey, L.M. 1926, Extraterritorial Crime, in American Journal Int. Law, pp. 757-765; 
Chilstein, R.I. 2003, Droit penal international et lois de polis: essai sur l'application dans l'espace  
du droit pénal accessoire, Paris.
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lem of jurisdiction. However there are more differences between these in-
struments.
The CoE Convention establishes a jurisdiction criterion that is based on 
the principle of territoriality.
Art. 22 of the CoE Convention states that:
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be ne-
cessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence … when the offence is com-
mitted in its territory”.
There is no change compared with traditional principles. The most im-
portant principle is always the place in which the criminal has committed a 
crime: the principle of territoriality. The option chosen by the CoE Conven-
tion is not adequate in the fight against cyber crime.
The cross-border character of cyber crime makes it easy for criminal to 
move their activities from one state of another at short time. In fact it is very 
difficult to determinate the locus committi delicti.
It is possible, moreover, to note that in the CoE Convention there is an 
“opening clause”.
Letter “d” in Art. 22 states that “by one of its nationals, if the offence is pun-
ishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is committed  
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State”. This article establishes the ap-
plication of the principle of criminal citizenship as an alternative to the prin-
ciple of territoriality. Its implementation is possible in two cases: if there is 
the respect of the principle of dual criminality. This condition is met if the 
conduct is punishable in application of the law of the State in which the fact 
has been committed and also in application of the law of the criminal cit-
izenship.
The second case: this principle is applicable if there is a negative conflict 
of jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional criterion  of the FD, conversely,  are more adequate to 
the transnational nature of cyber crime. Article 10 of the FD, establishes that:
“Each Member State shall establish its jurisdiction … where the offence has  
been committed: a) in whole or in part within its territory; or b) by one of its  
nationals; or c) for the benefit of a legal person that has its head office in the  
territory of that Member State”.
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The FD chooses the principle of ubiquity, in fact it establishes jurisdic-
tion of the State in which the offence has been committed in whole in its ter-
ritory and also of the State in which it has been committed only in part 
within its territory.
The applicability of this principle is very important in the fight against 
cyber crime. The application of the principle of territoriality causes prob-
lems in the field of definition the competent jurisdiction.
There will be really risk of the negative jurisdictional conflict. This situ-
ation can produce a benefit for cyber crime.
The CoE Convention establishes in Art. “d” a rule for the resolution of 
the negative conflict of jurisdiction.
In this case in application of Art. 22 it is possible to enforce the principle 
of criminal citizenship. Art. 22 only partially solves the problem, because in 
order to apply it in national law, it is necessary that this principle is enforce-
able in the national law. In the cases of cyber crime, there is frequently a 
positive conflict  of jurisdiction and many States  claim jurisdiction over a 
same crime. The CoE Convention states, with regard to this problem, that:
“When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence es-
tablished  in  accordance  with this  Convention,  the  Parties  involved shall,  
where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate  
jurisdiction for prosecution”.
The CoE convention does not define uniform criteria in order to resolve 
the  possible  positive  conflict  of  jurisdiction,  unlike  the  FD  on  Attacks 
against information system. The FD, in fact, states that:
“Sequential account may be taken of the following factors: the Member State  
shall be that in the territory of which the offences have been committed ac-
cording to paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2, – the Member State shall be that  
of which the perpetrator is a national, – the Member State shall be that in  
which the perpetrator has been found”.
The FD, in fact, establishes that the State can use these criteria in order to 
resolve the positive conflict of jurisdiction. Each State must include these 
criteria in its national law.
The field of application and the addressees of two legal instruments, are 
different. The CoE Convention is universal, because it can be signed by all 
States, and not only by the States Members of the CoE.
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Conversely, the FD is addressed to the Member States of EU. It is based 
on the mutual trust between Member States and also on the harmonization 
activity in this matter at EU level.
For this issue, the FD can produce more effects than those established in 
the Convention of the Council of Europe.
The difference between the jurisdiction criteria produces a lot of prob-
lems in the contest of the fight against cyber crime at international and na-
tional level.
The FD requires the Member States to modify their principles of jurisdic-
tion in conformity with its norms while the other States must apply the Coe 
Convention about cyber crime.
This could cause two different consequences.
The  States  can  bind  a  reserve  about  the  jurisdiction  rule  (Art.  22). 
Secondly, if all States implement the CoE Convention, regarding the juris-
dictional criteria, there is anyhow the problem of the difference between the 
jurisdiction rule of the Member States and those of the other States.
These differences enhance difficulties to prevent and prosecute crime.
A CASE OF CROSS-BORDER CYBER CRIME [3]
The case that we will analyse here can describe same problems concerning 
the fight against transnational cybercrimes.
In this particular case, the attacker violated a public interest system in 
Switzerland affecting Italian users connected to the compromised system. 
The attacker made use of a local vulnerability of the system thanks to which 
he modified his privileges from ‘normal user’ to ‘root user’. In the end he 
has the power of the Swiss cluster of PCs.
Also, in this case the attacker went on to install a ‘rootkit’ which makes a 
Trojan-like attack. The software used was complex and included a ‘sniffer’ 
to  copy  the  passwords  keyed  online  on  the  violated  system,  and  pro-
grammes which set up ‘backdoors’, in other words privileged access which, 
after the initial attack, can later be used to get back into the system. The 
‘rootkit’ also contains tools to hide any trace of the attack, by altering the 
system commands which enable the intrusion to be verified, cancelling the 
activity logs.
The  system compromised  by  the  attacker  is  of  ‘public  interest’  since 
thousands of users from all over the world are connected to the system and 
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because experiments are conducted using the hardware and software re-
sources located in Geneva. The system also hosts the necessary databases to 
conduct such experiments since they are essential for the purposes of sci-
entific  and technological  research.  There is  also an e-mail  service  for  re-
gistered users. Finally we know that the attack was launched from Geneva, 
the passwords belonged to Italian users who were connected to the violated 
computer system.
PASSWORD COPY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY [4]
In the case we are studying here, the first problem is to determine if the 
Italian law can be applied.
To answer this question it is necessary to analyse the presupposition for 
the Territorial applicability of Italian Criminal law.
The principle of territoriality is dealt with in Art. 6, par. 1, of the ICC, 
which defines Criminal Law as being applicable within the whole of territ-
ory of the State.  It  is therefore essential to define where the offence was 
committed. The offence is considered to have been committed within the 
territory of the State, when the action or omission giving rise to the offence 
carried out fully or partially there, or if the consequence of the action or 
omission was suffered there.9
Our criminal code, therefore, aims to expand the jurisdiction of Italian 
Criminal Law by establishing a principle of ubiquity, raising the question of 
how to define the ‘smallest part’ of a criminal act that can cause the offence 
to be considered as committed in Italy. The resulting problem of interpreta-
tion has found no unanimous solution at a doctrinal level and also creates 
divergences in case law.10
Conversely, according to another criterion based on a literal interpreta-
tion of the norm, the offence should be considered as coming under Italian 
jurisdiction when only part of it, whether completed or attempted, has been 
committed in Italian territory, provided that the ‘part’ was an essential com-
ponent of the offence. Such a decision must be taken after the event (ex post) 
9 Fiandaca & Musco, R.I. 1989, Manuale di diritto penale, Bologna.
10 Cfr. Judgemnt of Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I, 1980-11-28, Cassazione Penale, 1982, p. 735; 
Judgement of Corte di Cassazione, Sez. III. 1984-11-27, Cassazione Penale, 1986, p. 476; 
Judgement of Corte di Cassazione, Sez. I, 1984-11-30, Giustizia Penale, 1985, vol II; 
Judgement of Corte di Cassazione, Sez. VI, 1988-01-19, Rivista Penale, 1989, p. 416.
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and specifically, and not merely before the event (ex ante) and abstractly. 
Prevailing case law seems to accept this latter interpretation.
The jurisprudence  would  seem to  accept  the  theory  of  the  “potential 
commission of the deed”. However, the same ruling continues with a re-
strictive interpretation requiring that “an attempted criminal act carried out 
in  Italy  must  have  some corresponding  objective  impact  on  the  outside 
world”.11 The  criterion  of  ubiquity  is  particularly  applicable  to  offences 
committed over the Internet.12
The Italian Supreme Court  of  Appeal states that,  on the basis of  that 
principle, an Italian judge can try such an offence, either if it has been com-
mitted  in  national  territory  or  if  the  iter  criminis (crime  route)  initiated 
abroad has been completed with a crime committed in Italy. But in this case 
it is not applicable to Art. 6, because the attacker acted from Geneva, Suckit 
tools were installed on machines belonging to the Geneva’s system, copying 
the passwords keyed in by the users who were connected to the violated 
system.
The fact that the passwords were keyed in by Italian users, from com-
puters located in Italian territory, means that the ‘minimum requirement’ 
needed for Italian law to apply is not fulfilled. In this case, therefore, the 
principle of the ‘territoriality’ cannot be applied. In the case we are study-
ing, however, for all the above reasons it is not Italian Criminal Law that 
can be applied but Swiss law, which we will analyse in the following sec-
tions.
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE CRIME
WITH RESPECT TO THE PASSWORD COPY [4.1]
In this case it is necessary to analyse the concrete applicability of the crime 
of illegal access to a computer system (Art. 143-bis SCC) and of the crime of 
data theft (Art. 143 SCC).
Article  143-bis states  that  “Anyone,  who  without  authorization,  and 
without the intent of procuring an unlawful gain, accesses a data processing 
system which is specially protected against unauthorized access,  by elec-
11 Cass. Sez. III., January 10, 1961, Cass. pen., II, 811; for recent case law cfr. Cass. Sez. I, March 
20, 1963, Rivista italiana diritto e procedura penale, 1965, p 118; Cass. Sez. IV, 1993-02-22, 
Giustizia penale, 1993, II, n. 517, 629.
12 Picotti, L.M. 1999, I profili penali delle comunicazioni illecite via internet, Diritto dell’informazione  
e dell’informatica, p. 322-340.
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tronic devices, shall be sentenced to imprisonment or fines”. But in order to 
apply this article the system should be equipped with special security meas-
ures and there should not be any personal gain motive on the part of the of-
fender. This article is applicable if the attacker has acted simply to “get to 
know” the violated system.13 The absence of any personal gain motive on 
the part of the offender is an important feature of this new offence, although 
in early drafts the lack of any profit motive was merely a mitigating circum-
stance of the offence. Prevailing doctrine is of the opinion that if Art. 143-bis 
of the SCC does in fact define an abstract endangerment offence, this norm 
would not, however, be applicable in the case of concurrent circumstances 
making the offence punishable under Art. 143 of the SCC which, although 
this norm also provides for the concept of abstract endangerment, it also 
provides by law (ex lege) for specific intent, that is the intention to obtain 
gain either for the offender himself or for others. In the light of this inter-
pretation, Art. 143-bis of the SCC takes on a role as a residual norm, applic-
able in those limited cases in which an attacker has acted with the purpose 
of simply breaking in to the computer system, without intending to do any 
damage or remove any of the data in the system. Article 143 of the SCC 
states: "Anyone, to give himself or others an undue profit, power of attor-
ney, for himself or others, given he is not assigned and especially protected 
against non-authorized access, he records or transmits electronically or in a 
similar way, he is punished with confinement up to five years or with de-
tainment". As we have seen, Art. 143 of the SCC criminalizes the unlawful 
acquisition of data. The systematic position of this article which is included 
among crimes against property, and the meaning of the French term “sous-
traction”, have prompted doctrine to quietly interpret the term “acquisition” 
as having the same meaning as the French used in the legislative definition 
of the offence of theft referred to in Art. 139 of the SCC. According to the 
Swiss doctrine, in order to include the offence of “soustraction des données” it 
is  essential  that  there  be  a  theft  (“soustraction”  in  the  French  text  and 
“wegnehmen” in the German version) of the data, causing harm to the right-
ful owner. According to this approach, the mere fact of copying the data 
13 Schwbarth, R.I. 1990, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Strafrecht, Bes. Tail., 2 Band; Trechsail, 
R.I. 1989, Schweizerischs Strafgesetzvbuch Kurkkommentar, Zurich.
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does not in itself constitute an offence under Art. 143 of the SCC.14 In this 
case, doctrine considers that Art. 143-bis could be applicable, provided that 
there is no intent to make any unlawful profit nor, therefore, any specific in-
tent. In the light of the prevailing interpretation, it must be stressed that the 
abovementioned norm will only be applicable in the rarest of cases, since it 
is easily avoidable by the attacker, who can just copy the data – even with 
the purpose of unlawful gain – and still not be liable to be tried for any of 
the offences we have been studying. The fact that the attacker copied the 
passwords could be understood as fulfilling the requirement referred to in 
Art. 143 of the SCC. However the requirement of “material theft” of data 
from the violated system has not been met. For the conduct to be punish-
able, Swiss legislation also requires the offender to have acted with the pur-
pose of obtaining an unlawful gain either for himself or for others. In the 
case we are studying, the intention of obtaining some gain cannot be proved 
and, if we wanted to interpret the norm in its broadest possible sense, by 
equating “the intent to damage” a system with the degree of harm caused 
by someone who acts with the intent to obtain an unlawful gain for himself 
or for others, we would be committing a violation of the principle of legality 
set out in Art. 1 of the SCC. When the attacker commits the offence with the 
intention of damaging or copying a system’s data but the offender does not 
succeed in carrying out his criminal intent, it may give rise to doubts con-
cerning whether the offence should be tried under Art. 143-bis of the SCC, 
as a completed offence, or under Art. 143 SCC, as a case of an attempted of-
fence. The same Swiss doctrine considered the possibility of punishing un-
der Art. 143 of the SCC anyone making an unauthorised access to a com-
puter system simply in order to get an idea of its potential or its vulnerabil-
ities, with the purpose of using this information to obtain for himself or oth-
ers an unlawful gain. And also in this case there is a problem: if we apply 
art. 143-bis as a completed crime, the conduct does not turn out punished 
entirely. If we apply art. 143 as an attempted crime there is not the material 
theft of data.
In the case we are considering now, our attacker could be sentenced to 
arrest – certainly not for too long – if the Swiss magistracy opted to apply 
Art. 143-bis of the SCC. If the offence were deemed not to fall within the 
14 Strauffecher, Infraction countre le patrimonie: le nuoveau droit, cit., p. 14.
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scope of application of that particular article,  our attacker could take ad-
vantage of the diversity of possible punishments for the same offence under 
different judicial systems and would benefit from the criminal safe haven in 
which he had chosen to conduct his criminal activities.
If it was possible to apply Italian criminal law, it was possible to identify 
several different criminal activities and a concurrence of offences forming 
part of a single criminal act.
First of all the attacker has made an illegal access to a computer system, 
a conduct which is defined in Art. 615-ter of the Italian Criminal Code (ICC) 
and it carries a penalty from one to three years’ imprisonment. In our case, 
the attacker in question had been granted the rights of a normal user, not 
those of a root user.15 That represents, according to prevailing case law, the 
ius excludendi. This condition is necessary in order to enforce Art. 615-ter. 
According to this technical information, we can identify a second criminally 
punishable offence: when the attacker installed the ‘rootkit’, he would have 
been guilty of the conduct defined in Art. 617-quinquies of the ICC. The in-
stallation of the ‘sniffer’ programme, one of the components of the ‘rootkit’, 
allowed the attacker to capture the passwords of users connected from Italy, 
with the aim of ensuring the possibility of attacking more machines and ex-
tending the radius of action of the same unlawful conduct.16 Art. 615-quater 
of the ICC defines the illicit possession of access codes to informatics and 
telematics systems as an offence, which is also applicable to the case we are 
studying. In order to charge the criminal responsibility of this offence it is 
not necessary to cause any actual damage to the system; the mere fact of 
having accessed some of the systems is sufficient. For cyber-crime it is not 
always feasible to identify the locus commissi delicti (the place where the of-
fence  was  committed)  when  the  offender  makes  use  of  informatics  and 
telematic means to commit the offence.
15 Cfr. Trentacapilli, L.M. 2002, Accesso abusivo ad un sistema informatico e adeguatezza delle  
misure di protezione, Diritto Penale e Processo, n. 10, p. 1280-1295; Nunziata, L.M. 1998, La  
prima applicazione giurisprudenziale del delitto di accesso abusivo ad un sistema informatico – ex  
art. 615-ter, Nota alla sentenza del Trib. Torino, 7 febbraio 1998, Giurisprudenza di merito, vol. 
II, p. 711-715; contrary Judgment of G.u.p. Trib. of Rome, 2000-04-21, www.penale.it
16 Judgment of Corte di Cassazione penale, 2000-12-6, whit study of Galdieri, L.M. 2001, 
L’introduzione contro la volontà del titolare fa scattare la responsabilità dell’hacker, Diritto 
dell’informatica, vol. I, pp. 17-25.
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CONCLUSIONS [5]
In conclusion it can be assumed that the CoE Convention on cyber crime 
does not  resolve the problems concerning the jurisdiction,  since it  estab-
lishes the principle of territoriality. This criterion is not able to persecute 
and punish cases of cyber crime. The conclusion would be that many differ-
ences exist between legislation within the EU and at international level, and 
that this may cause a problematic situation. The intrinsic international and 
cross-border  character  of  cyber  crime  is  proof  enough  that  actions  are 
needed both at global international and at EU-level. Then the Commission 
is preparing a new general policy initiative, consisting of a Communication 
on the fight against cyber crime at EU level.17 The option consisting of a co-
herent strategy on the fight against cyber crime has thus been chosen. The 
strategy will give the EU Commission a central coordinating role in Europe. 
With regard to its limited competence in this field, it is clear that the Com-
mission will  play this  role  only when a clear  added value can be estab-
lished. The concrete policy can be divided into four policy areas or instru-
ments:  improved  European  law  enforcement  cooperation;  increased 
European public-private  cooperation,  improved international  cooperation 
and specific legislation. In particular, in the field of international coopera-
tion, the policy instrument aims at better coordinating EU actions against 
cyber crime with external and international initiatives. In fact, cyber crime 
in Europe is a phenomenon which may originate or have its effects far bey-
ond the borders  of the EU. A global  approach is  thus especially needed 
when it comes to the fight against this type of crime.
In conclusion,  at  EU level,  it  is  necessary to  see  the  evolution of  the 
European Court of Justice in this specific matter. The judgment in Case C-
176/0318 Commission v. Council and the judgment in Case C-440/0519 clarify 
the distribution of powers between the First and Third Pillars as regards 
provisions of criminal law. The Court of Justice had annulled the Council 
FD 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment through criminal law, 
17 Cfr. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the  
committee of the Regions, Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber crime, of May 22, 
2007, COM (2007) 267 final, http://europa.eu.
18 Cfr. Judgment of European Court of Justice, of 2005-09-13 2005, Commission v. Council, C-
176/03, http://www.curia.europa.eu/it/index.htm
19 Cfr. Judgment of European Court of Justice of 2007-10-23, Commission c. Council, C-440/05, 
http://www.curia.europa.eu/it/index.htm.
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which required the Member States to provide for criminal sanctions in the 
case of the offences against environmental law set out in the FD, on the 
grounds that the power to impose such an obligation on the Member States 
is a matter for a Community instrument and the Commission had in fact 
proposed  the  adoption  of  such  an  instrument.  However,  the  judgment 
makes it clear that criminal law as such does not constitute a Community 
policy, since Community action in criminal matters may be based only on 
implicit  powers associated with a specific  legal basis. Hence, appropriate 
measures of criminal law can be adopted on a Community basis only at sec-
toral level and only on condition that there is a clear need to combat serious 
shortcomings in the implementation of the Community’s objectives and to 
provide for criminal law measures to ensure the full effectiveness of a Com-
munity policy or the proper functioning of a freedom. From the point of 
view of subject matter, in addition to environmental protection the Court’s 
reasoning can therefore be applied to all Community policies and freedoms 
which involve binding legislation with which criminal penalties should be 
associated in order to ensure their effectiveness. The Court makes no dis-
tinction according to the nature of the criminal law measures. Its approach 
is functional. The basis on which the Community legislature may provide 
for  measures of  criminal  law is  the necessity to  ensure  that  Community 
rules and regulations are complied with. When for a given sector, the Com-
mission considers that criminal law measures are required in order to en-
sure that Community law is fully effective, these measures may, depending 
on the needs of the sector in question, include the actual principle of resort-
ing to criminal penalties, the definition of the offence – that is, the constitu-
ent element of the offence – and, where appropriate the nature and level of 
the criminal penalties applicable, or other aspects relating to criminal law. It 
is the specific requirement of the Community policy or freedom in question 
which  constitutes  the  link  with  the  legal  basis  of  the  EC  Treaty  which 
provides the justification for such measures. Again it is on a case by case 
basis, depending on necessity, that the Commission will determine the de-
gree of Community involvement in the criminal field, whilst giving priority 
as much as possible to horizontal measures not specific to the relevant sec-
tor.  Although  the  Community  legislature  may  use  the  criminal  law  to 
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achieve its objectives, it may do so only if two conditions – necessity20 and 
consistency21 – are met. As a result of the Court’s judgment any FD are en-
tirely or partly incorrect, since all or some of their provisions were adopted 
on the wrong legal basis. Since the wrong legal basis of the FD could, in 
some cases,  undermine  the  national  implementing  legislation.  There  are 
several ways in which existing law can be rectified in the light of the judg-
ment. One approach would be to review the existing instruments with the 
sole  purpose  of  bringing  them into line  with the  distribution of  powers 
between the First and the Third Pillar as laid down in the Court judgment. 
In such a case, the Commission’s proposals would not contain any provi-
sions  which  differed  in  substance  from those  of  the  acts  adopted,  even 
where the Commission felt that these acts were not satisfactory. The FD on 
attacks against information system can be transfused in a directive and the 
EU law in this matter should be in measure to give a concrete and effective 
answer to the cyber crime.
In conclusion it is possible to note that the Lisbon Treaty establishes the 
complete  comunitarization of  the  cooperation  in  criminal  matter.  In  this 
context, in the future, the EU institutions will have the possibility to adopt 
legal instruments in measure to bring the national criminal law.
20 Any use of measures of criminal law must be justified by the need to make the Community 
policy in question effective. In principle, responsibility for the proper application of 
Community law lies with the Member States. In some cases, however, it is necessary to 
direct the action of the Member States by specifying explicitly, the type of behaviour which 
constitutes a criminal offence and/or the type of penalties to be applied and/or other 
criminal-law measures appropriate to the area concerned. Checks must be carried out to 
establish necessity and the observance of the principles of subsidiary and proportionality at 
each of these stages.
21 The criminal-law measures adopted at sectoral level on a Community basis must respect the 
overall consistency of the Union’s system of criminal law, whether adopted on the basis of 
the first or the third pillar, to ensure that criminal provisions do not become fragmented 
and ill-matched. If a sector seems to require specific rules in order to implement the 
objectives of the EC Treaty, the relationship between these specific rules and the horizontal 
rules should if necessary be clarified. Care must also be taken to ensure that the Member 
States or the persons concerned are not required to comply with conflicting obligations. 
When using its right of initiative, the Commission will take the utmost care to ensure that 
this consistency is preserved. Parliament and the Council must also take account of this 
requirement in their own internal organisation.
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